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Abstract
This article analyzes and compares the dynamically changing outcomes of 
anti-sweatshop campaigns in France and Switzerland through a qualitative 
comparative case study using interviews and analysis of firsthand and 
secondary data. In both countries, some targeted firms made early 
concessions and later withdrew from those concessions. To explain these 
changing outcomes over time, the article develops a perspective that puts 
emphasis on interaction phases and highlights corporate strategic responses 
to anti-sweatshop movement demands. Analyzing those responses as 
driven by legitimacy contests between companies and activists, the study 
explains why anti-sweatshop movements had significant outcomes early 
on and shows the mechanisms that allowed firms to withdraw from initial 
concessions at a later stage. In the course of changing interaction dynamics 
and contexts, companies developed strategies building on competing sources 
of legitimacy to circumvent movement demands. The companies thereby 
compensated for the legitimacy losses inflicted by their withdrawal from 
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earlier concessions and the legitimacy deficits of other solutions. The analysis 
reveals three strategies firms used to achieve and compensate legitimacy 
and discusses their contextual combination comparing the two cases: 
inter-firm cooperation, ethical product labels originating in collaborations 
with competing social movement actors, and publicly fighting back against 
campaign makers.
Keywords
legitimacy, social movements, strategic response, multi-stakeholder initiative, 
fair trade labels, concession
The Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC) is a European-wide coordinated cam-
paign to fight against sweatshop in the clothing industry. The campaign 
started in the Netherlands in the early 1990s and consists of more than 10 
nationally autonomous nongovernmental organization (NGO) coalitions. 
Using petitions, rankings, and many other protest forms, the campaign 
demands that targeted retailers adopt the Clean Clothes code of conduct and 
join multi-stakeholder initiatives with social movement participation to inde-
pendently control the respect of labor norms (Sluiter, 2009).
This study analyzes the effects of the CCC in two countries: France and 
Switzerland. At the end of the 1990s, the French CCC had managed to collabo-
rate with the retailer Auchan on a series of factory inspections at production 
facilities. Five years later, the campaign was in open conflict with Auchan and 
its other main targets. The retailers had built up their own monitoring initiative 
on working conditions that excluded the campaign, and they were defying the 
campaign’s legitimacy. In Switzerland, three companies started working 
together with the CCC in a multi-stakeholder monitoring project (MSI) in 
2000. Five years later, this MSI still existed, but firms had also launched a 
variety of ethical labels, and many of them had joined a business-driven moni-
toring initiative without participation of social movement stakeholders.
The outcomes of these two national social movement campaigns—their 
impact on firms’ policies with regard to the issue of labor conditions in global 
supply chains—had changed over time: Early achievements for campaign 
makers got lost after a few years. The key research question is how early 
gains for campaigns give way to a situation in France and Switzerland where 
some corporations withdrew from concessions and adopted strategies of 
which campaign actors were highly critical.
Scholars of the “contentiousness of markets” (B. G. King & Pearce, 
2010) have studied the conditions favoring protest effects on corporations. 
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In particular, studies have identified the corporate and industry-level factors 
that explain companies’ compliance with social movement demands (Briscoe 
& Safford, 2008; de Bakker & den Hond, 2008; den Hond & de Bakker, 
2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Holzer, 2008; B. G. King, 2008b; B. G. King 
& Soule, 2007; Raeburn, 2004; Schurman, 2004; Schurman & Munro, 2009; 
Soule, 2009; Vasi, 2009; Wahlström & Peterson, 2006; Weber, Thomas, & 
Rao, 2009; Zald, Morrill, & Rao, 2005). Some scholars have also pointed at 
firms’ use of reputation management (McDonnell & King, 2013), grassroots 
lobbying (Walker, 2009), or the development of private regulation (Bartley, 
2007; Fransen, 2012b) as responses to social movement demands. Yet stud-
ies on the effects of protest on corporations so far have largely overlooked 
the long-term dynamics of corporate responses. Social movements are sus-
tained collective challenges to authorities. They often go on for many years, 
bringing up the same set of demands against the same targets in specific 
campaigns. When adopting such a long-term perspective, it appears that 
early innovative actions of social movements may hit targets by surprise and 
lead to initial protest success (McAdam, 1983). But such early success need 
not last. Targeted companies then learn and adapt their strategies. They 
develop new ways to counter social movement demands (Barley, 2010) and 
may eventually respond to movements more effectively. In this process, 
movement outcomes can change over time.
This article develops a long-term perspective focusing on social move-
ment campaigns and corporate responses to shed light on outcome dynamics. 
On the basis of a comparative case study of the CCCs in France and 
Switzerland, two countries in which some firms made early concessions and 
later withdrew from them, the article asks two main questions. First, what 
explains early successes1 by movements? And second, how did firms defend 
alternative responses or even manage to withdraw from early concessions in 
spite of continuing challenges from social movement campaigns? To under-
stand changing corporate reactions to protest, the study builds on and devel-
ops the notion of “legitimation politics” (Fransen, 2012b), which states that 
corporate responses to social movement challenges are driven by legitimacy 
contests between activists and companies.
The first question addresses the factors that explain corporate reactions to 
protest. Findings from many studies suggest that distinctive corporate char-
acteristics explain divergent responses to the same campaign. The long-term 
perspective adds the fact that a campaign’s newness favors “successful” 
campaign outcomes at this early stage, because at this stage, campaigners 
are privileged conveyors of legitimacy. The second question concerns out-
come dynamics. Based on its empirical analysis, the study argues that firms 
use competing sources of legitimacy to circumvent movement demands and 
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to compensate for the legitimacy losses inflicted by their withdrawal from 
earlier concessions and the legitimacy deficits of other solutions. In particu-
lar, the analysis reveals three strategies firms used to achieve and compen-
sate legitimacy and discusses their contextual combination: inter-firm 
cooperation, ethical product labels originating in collaborations with com-
peting social movement actors, and publicly fighting back against campaign 
makers.
This analysis offers three contributions to the existing literature on corpo-
rate responses to protest. First, it points at the issue of outcome dynamics. It 
argues that it is important to analyze interactions between social movements 
and companies over time, and suggests studying campaigns to do so. Second, 
and more specifically, the analysis observes a characteristic outcome 
dynamic that goes from early concessions to withdrawal. The study offers an 
explanation for this outcome dynamic by highlighting the role different 
sources of legitimacy play in corporate counterstrategies. Finally, through a 
comparative perspective, the study shows how legitimacy-seeking strategies 
are context dependent.
In a case-centered comparison research design (Della Porta, 2008), the 
French and Swiss cases are analyzed and compared building on a qualita-
tive research consisting of more than 30 interviews with campaigners, com-
pany officials, and other involved actors, and an extensive analysis of 
documents and secondary sources to retrace the interactions between cam-
paign makers and their corporate targets over time. France and Switzerland 
were chosen as cases for two main reasons: First, they both experienced a 
very similar anti-sweatshop campaign. Second, campaigns differed in 
important contextual conditions and with regard to the characteristics of the 
firms that were targeted. The comparative research design helps reveal the 
diversity of possible counterstrategies and can show how the compensating 
of legitimacy and the use of different legitimacy sources are related to con-
textual conditions.
The article consists of five more sections following this introduction. 
The next section develops the theoretical framework. The subsequent sec-
tion gives more information on sources and methods and addresses the 
issue of case selection. The subsequent empirical section describes the 
strategic interactions of the French and Swiss campaigns with their corpo-
rate targets, distinguishing between two phases—the first leading to cor-
porate concessions, the second characterized by the withdrawal from 
initial concessions by some companies and by the development of alterna-
tive corporate responses. The next analytical section explains the cam-
paigns’ early gains and their subsequent loss, looking at the corporate 
strategies that allowed for a retreat from initial concessions. The article 
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ends with a conclusion highlighting the contributions of the analysis and 
discussing the limitations of the research design with regard to 
generalizability.
Theoretical Framework
Explaining Changing Corporate Responses to Social Movement 
Demands
Social movements can be defined as “collective challenges, based on common 
purposes and social solidarities, in sustained interaction with elites, oppo-
nents, and authorities” (Tarrow, 1994, p. 4). In explicit analogy to research on 
social movement outcomes (Amenta & Caren, 2004; Bosi & Uba, 2009; 
Giugni, 2004; Giugni, McAdam, & Tilly, 1999), scholars studying movements 
targeting industries or corporations have analyzed what explains corporate 
reactions to movement demands. Studies have highlighted movement internal 
factors such as tactics (Ingram, Yue, & Rao, 2010; B. G. King, 2008a; Raeburn, 
2004) or framing (Lounsbury, Ventresca, & Hirsch, 2003; Raeburn, 2004), 
characteristics of corporations (Briscoe & Safford, 2008; de Bakker & den 
Hond, 2008; den Hond & de Bakker, 2007; Eesley & Lenox, 2006; Holzer, 
2008; Luders, 2006, 2011; Weber et al., 2009; Zald et al., 2005) and industries 
(B. G. King, 2008b; B. G. King & Soule, 2007; Raeburn, 2004; Schurman, 
2004; Schurman & Munro, 2009; Soule, 2009; Vasi, 2009; Wahlström & 
Peterson, 2006), and the interplay between the two (B. G. King, 2008b).
Possible corporate reactions to movement demands vary. Beyond corpora-
tions yielding to demands or failing to do so—the question at the center of 
most studies—a wide range of strategic options exist (Balsiger, 2015a). Zald 
et al. (2005), for instance, point at different tactical options organizations have 
to fight back, such as taking legal action against their challengers. Oliver’s 
(1991) classification of organizations’ strategic responses to institutional pres-
sure offers a rather comprehensive picture of possible reactions. Oliver distin-
guishes five strategic responses: acquiescence, compromise, avoidance, 
defiance, and manipulation. From complete conformity and compliance with 
pressures to fighting against them and even manipulating them, the strategies 
identified span the possibilities of responses to institutional pressures and can 
be usefully applied to responses of firms to movement challengers. Depending 
on their cost structures and vulnerability to legitimacy issues, firms have dif-
ferent dispositions to comply with demands, and will prefer different strategic 
responses (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007; Bies, Bartunek, 
Fort, & Zald, 2007; Brickson, 2007; A. King, 2007; B. G. King, 2008a; B. G. 
King & Soule, 2007; Schurman, 2004; Weber et al., 2009; Zald et al., 2005).
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Legitimacy and Changing Outcomes Over Time
Studies with a long-term perspective and thus attentive to outcome dynamics 
have emphasized the importance of initial actions leading to early outcomes. 
New tactical forms have been shown to have more impact at the beginning of 
mobilization cycles and campaigns, as they provoke media reactions and may 
hit targets unprepared (Jasper & Poulsen, 1993; McAdam, 1983; Taylor & 
Van Dyke, 2004). While some studies have thus pointed at the role of novelty 
as a factor favoring movement outcomes, scholars have so far mostly failed 
to acknowledge that in the course of continued movement–target interac-
tions, initial outcomes can get transformed and even lost over time. A theory 
of movement effects on their targets thus concerns “not effects alone, but also 
the very dynamics of social movement interactions” (Tilly, 1999, p. 270). The 
neglect of this dynamic aspect of outcomes is perhaps due to the fact that 
most studies look at legislative change (Amenta & Caren, 2004), a context 
where outcomes, once achieved, tend to be difficult to overturn. But when 
targeting corporations, it is arguably more difficult for social movements to 
achieve durable outcomes, unless they are (a) authoritatively implemented 
through the law or (b) locked into institutional arrangements with positive 
feedback effects, which makes exit difficult and costly (Pierson, 2000). If 
such is not the case, we find instances of competing solutions and strategies 
(Bartley, 2007) and observe, for instance, the evolution of policies of corpo-
rate social responsibility (Schrempf-Stirling & Palazzo, 2013). Outcome 
dynamics may switch from early concessions to other responses, including 
withdrawal from concessions.
Why do firms withdraw from initial concessions, and what strategies allow 
them to do so when facing continued public pressure from social movement 
campaigns? Existing explanations of why firms withdraw from complying 
with movement demands point at push factors, in particular the negative expe-
riences of firms in multi-stakeholder institutions, which are perceived as 
costly, ineffective, and slow (Fransen, 2012a, 2012b). This negative percep-
tion is sometimes heightened by disputes between different types of civil soci-
ety actors, in particular between unions and NGOs (Egels-Zandén & Wahlqvist, 
2007). Concession costs, in other words, are high, and firms prefer less costly 
solutions. At the same time, the rise of private regulation has resulted in situa-
tions of institutional diversity with different competing voluntary programs; 
corporate actors may opt out of one scheme and embrace another one over 
time (Bartley, 2007, 2009). The development of such alternatives can serve as 
pull factors.
But when facing ongoing challenges, just backing away from concessions 
is often not a feasible option; such a move is associated with legitimacy 
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losses, which firms cannot ignore. Therefore, even if push and pull factors 
drive firms to withdraw from concessions, they need to lean on alternative 
legitimacy strategies to do so. Analyzing programs for code monitoring in 
European retailing, in particular the competition between business-driven 
programs and multi-stakeholder initiatives, Fransen (2012a, 2012b) suggests 
examining the process as one of legitimation politics, thus building on and 
extending institutional theory’s core insight of the importance of complying 
with norms (Oliver, 1991). Legitimation politics rests on the quest of compa-
nies for legitimacy: conformation with social norms, values, and expectations 
(Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). Organizational actors are “legitimacy seeking but 
embedded in multiple organizational fields and, therefore, weighing different 
kinds of organizational pressure against each other at any given point in time” 
(Fransen, 2012b, p. 172). Depending on contexts and on organizational char-
acteristics, they will deploy different strategies to establish or increase 
legitimacy.
This study argues that when firms retreat from concessions and/or respond 
with strategies that do not comply with movement demands while facing 
continuing public pressure, they use and combine strategies building on dif-
ferent sources of legitimacy. Adding to the existing literature on corporate 
responses to movement demands, it analyzes how different legitimacy strate-
gies are combined over time. In the early campaign phases, campaign makers 
have an advantage as they may appear as the principal actors who are able to 
convey legitimacy to the companies they target. But as contentious interac-
tions go on, new legitimacy strategies are developed. Legitimacy can be con-
veyed through different sources or means (Mena & Palazzo, 2012; Quack, 
2010): For instance, efficiency, professional skills, inclusiveness, or the 
endorsement by a particular organization can give legitimacy. Not all sources 
are equally legitimate, however, and campaign makers publicly criticize and 
mobilize against responses that do not fully comply with campaign demands. 
Therefore, when firms face continuous challenges, they combine different 
sources of legitimacy to counter movement demands. Those strategies allow 
them to compensate for the legitimacy losses inflicted by the withdrawal 
from concessions and make up for the legitimacy deficits of alternative 
solutions.
To sum up, there are situations where movement pressures lead companies 
to different strategic responses. Figure 1 schematically presents the different 
steps of an analysis of outcome dynamics. Firms’ cost structures and vulner-
ability to legitimacy challenges provide them with distinct incentive sets to 
respond to social movement campaigns, leading to different responses. This 
responsiveness is the first step of the analysis. But those responses need not 
be permanent. Over time, firms can operate strategic changes and even opt 
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out of previous commitments. An analysis of dynamic outcomes takes this 
possibility into account and studies the factors that lead to the development 
of alternative responses and the legitimacy strategies they rely on.
Method
Case Selection and Comparison
To study outcome dynamics and the role of corporate legitimacy strategies 
therein, the article compares the CCC in Switzerland and France and the 
reactions of firms to it. The case-centered comparative strategy (Della Porta, 
2008) serves to show how different contexts and interaction dynamics led to 
the use of different combinations of legitimacy compensation strategies. The 
cases of Switzerland and France were selected for two reasons. First, the 
cases are similar because the same campaign took place in both countries, 
using very similar framing strategies (Snow, 2004) and tactical action reper-
toires (Taylor & Van Dyke, 2004). In France and Switzerland, companies 
belonging to the retailing sector selling clothes were confronted with move-
ment demands from the mid-1990s onward. The CCC in both countries 
demanded that retailers adopt the code of conduct developed by the cam-
paign and have it independently monitored by a (yet to be created) 
Figure 1. Outcomes over time.
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multi-stakeholder institution. The French CCC was launched in 1995 with a 
campaign called “Libère tes fringues” (free your clothes), using a postcard 
petition. In the following years, various campaign rounds varied the same 
demands. The Swiss campaign started in the late 1990s, targeting first 
sneaker brands and then the main clothing retailers. In both France and 
Switzerland, campaigns were carried out by coalitions of NGOs, including 
development aid organizations, unions, and consumer associations in 
France, and NGOs and an advocacy group from the field of development 
politics in Switzerland (Balsiger, 2014).
Second, comparing campaign outcome dynamics in these two countries is 
heuristically beneficial because campaigns differed in important contextual 
conditions and with regard to the characteristics of the firms that were tar-
geted. First, while there had been a range of “consumption campaigns” in 
Switzerland in the decades preceding the CCC, this was not the case for 
France. As a consequence, some of the targeted Swiss retailers had already 
previous experiences of collaboration with NGOs active in the CCC, while 
such ties were absent in France. Second, ethical markets exemplified by 
organic and fair trade labels available in big retailing outlets started to develop 
in Switzerland during the 1990s in parallel to the CCC activities. In France, 
these market segments only started to develop significantly in the mid-2000s, 
after the campaign (NZZ, 1992, 2000; Le Monde, 1997, 2007). And third, the 
characteristics of the targeted firms were different across countries. In France, 
after some target changes in the first campaign years, the main targets were big 
general and sports retailers. In Switzerland, it was a broader group of firms, 
including also smaller companies. In addition, the two main Swiss retailers, 
sharing more than 80% of the market, both have origins in the cooperative 
movement, which is not the case in France. There were thus differences in the 
size of individual firms and the composition of the group.
Data and Data Analysis
The study compares the CCC in France and Switzerland throughout its unfold-
ing, that is, from mid-1995 to 2005 in the French case (at that time, the cam-
paign ceased temporarily) and from early 1999 to 2008 in the Swiss case. The 
study is based on qualitative fieldwork conducted with the goal of reconstruct-
ing the interactions of the campaign using different kinds of firsthand and 
secondhand data (for a complete account of the campaigns’ origins and 
dynamics, see Balsiger, 2014). Regarding firsthand data, the case studies rely 
on interviews, archival research, the analysis of campaign documents, reports, 
and other documents produced by other actors, particularly corporations, and 
participant observation. The fieldwork originally focused on the functioning 
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of the campaign, by conducting about 30 interviews with officials of the Swiss 
and French campaign from the past and present, as well as with other core 
actors from different initiatives in the field of ethical clothing such as repre-
sentatives of other NGOs collaborating with firms or state actors. The semi-
structured interviews were conducted between 2007 and 2008 in different 
places in Switzerland and France. They focused on the campaign dynamic and 
the major issues the campaign or its targets faced in its course, lasted between 
1 and 3 hr with an average length of approximately 90 min, and were taped 
and transcribed. Together with a study of the internal archives of the French 
campaign,2 as well as the analysis of all the different publications (booklets, 
leaflets, petitions, etc.) by the campaigns in both countries, this research 
allowed reconstructing the dynamics and processes of the campaigns. 
Regarding corporate action, the fieldwork consisted of interviews with man-
agers of Swiss firms targeted by the campaign, the analysis of corporate 
reports and publications, press sources, as well as the use of secondary sources 
such as studies focusing on corporations and the information on corporate 
actions one can find in the campaign publications. Indeed, campaign actors 
themselves very closely followed the different initiatives launched by corpo-
rations, as this following was their main preoccupation, and they reliably kept 
track of the different initiatives launched.
The data were analyzed building on process tracing, which consists in the 
reconstruction of causal processes underlying the interactions between cam-
paigners and their corporate targets (Collier, 2011). The multiplication of 
sources and their triangulation (Ayoub, Wallace, & Zepeda-Millán, 2014) 
minimizes risks of partiality and subjectivity in the interpretation. Whenever 
possible, specific findings were corroborated through more than one source 
of evidence, relying on assessments by both key participants in the process 
and written accounts from different origins: publications by campaigners and 
by firms, press reports, internal documents when available. It is true however 
that given the original focus of fieldwork and given a more difficult access to 
direct sources in the corporate sector, the collected data were richer and more 
encompassing on movement actors, allowing for a fine-tuned analysis of the 
reflections and constraints that guide their decisions. For corporate actors, 
data allow for an accurate reconstruction of their reactions to the campaigns 
but give overall less direct insights into actor motivations and processes inter-
nal to firms, making it more speculative to explain what drives corporate 
decisions. In spite of this limit, it is possible to develop a reading of the out-
comes of the movement that produces insights not accounted for by conven-
tional models.3
Finally, it is important to note that because fieldwork did not include 
actual measurements of working conditions in producing factories, campaign 
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“losses” (i.e., withdrawal from concessions by corporations) do not automati-
cally mean that the situation for workers actually worsened as a result. The 
discussion of outcomes refers to the interactions between the Swiss and 
French campaigns and their immediate targets—Swiss and French retailers 
and clothing brands. In this respect, building up a business-driven monitoring 
initiative such as the French Initiative Clause Sociale (ICS), through its audit-
ing mechanisms, may have improved workers’ conditions more than the first 
tentative collaborations between one firm and the campaign makers.4 
Nonetheless, from the point of view of movement–target interactions and 
outcomes, the firm’s backtracking from associating the campaign makers to 
the monitoring process constitutes a step back, as outcomes now correspond 
less to what movements demand.
The Strategic Interactions of the Campaigns in 
France and Switzerland
This section briefly describes the different moves of the campaigns and their 
targets in chronological order.5 For both cases, two phases are distinguished: 
a first phase leading up to initial concessions and a second phase where these 
concessions (partly) got lost.
France: Phase 1—From Ignorance to Collaboration
The French campaign coalition launched three consecutive petitions in its 
first few years of existence. Another parallel petition was carried out by allied 
NGOs and later merged with the CCC coalition. While the petitions were 
meant to speak to all clothing retailers, their explicitly mentioned targets 
changed over time and gradually focused on the big national retailers and the 
sports industry. The first firms to show substantive reactions belonged to the 
sports retailing industry: Its federation issued a code of conduct, but it was 
nonbinding for its members. More significant was Auchan’s and Carrefour’s 
response, two major retailers. After initial talks with one of the campaign 
NGOs,6 the latter started collaborating with the Fédération internationale des 
droits de l’homme (FIDH), an NGO that was not part of the campaign coali-
tion. The FIDH should overview the application of Carrefour’s code of con-
duct. Auchan took collaboration efforts further: Numerous talks with the 
campaign coalition took place, as well as training sessions for buyers and a 
few monitoring projects in factories.
In parallel, the industry association Fédération des entreprises du com-
merce et de la distribution (FCD), of which all major retailers were members 
(including Carrefour and Auchan), became an important player. It declared 
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that it wanted to commit itself to the improvement of working conditions and 
their control and created an initiative called ICS to coordinate the monitoring 
of codes of conduct between the firms that were part of it. The ICS was a 
business-driven monitoring initiative and built on social audits conducted by 
specialized audit firms; as such, it was clearly a reaction of the firms to the 
campaign’s demands. The coalition had, in a first stage, positive signals from 
the ICS that it could get associated to the program: As internal documents 
show, there were frequent exchanges and campaign makers were invited to 
attend meetings with the ICS. Therefore, after the third petition in 1998, 
which gathered more signatures than ever, the campaign organizers decided 
to take a break with public campaigning to push forward negotiations with 
companies and further develop the idea of a “social label.”
France: Phase 2—Escalation
After the pause in public campaigning, the campaign coalition came back 
with a tactical innovation in 2000: the so-called school grades, a ranking of 
firms according to their “social performance.” This ranking focused on big 
retailers and on sports retailers, which were from now on the only targeted 
firms. The goal of the tactical innovation was to increase pressure on retail-
ers. The main difference between the ranking and previous petitions was that 
firms were now explicitly compared with one another; internal documents 
clearly stated this competition as its tactical goal. In the first ranking, only 
two of 14 companies were evaluated somewhat positively. In addition, imitat-
ing school grades, the rankings took on a somewhat condescending and mor-
alistic tone. The bad grades and the tone employed by the campaigners 
prompted the FCD/ICS to react strongly, scheduling a press conference on 
the same day the third ranking was published and writing an open letter where 
it attacked the campaign makers and questioned their legitimacy, while 
defending its own approach of code monitoring. As a next step, the firms 
gathered in the ICS refused to respond to the questionnaire preparing the 
fourth ranking and gave a common answer instead. As they were all part of 
the joint social audit initiative, they argued, there was no difference as to their 
“social record.” The common answer was signed by all the firms by then part 
of the ICS, a total of 11 companies (among them Auchan and Carrefour). The 
goal was thus to prevent the campaign organizers from publishing yet another 
ranking. In spite of this goal, the campaign coalition did publish a fourth 
evaluation opposing the firms, albeit in the somewhat watered down form of 
a “social barometer.” Indeed, the counterstrategy of the firms provoked 
infights within the campaign coalition. Some coalition members pleaded for 
a continuation of this strategy, while others advocated a more 
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uncompromising stance. The coalition did not find an issue to these internal 
strategic debates; eventually, because of a lack of funding, it ceased activity 
altogether by the end of 2005.
Switzerland: Phase 1—Collaboration
The Swiss CCC focused its attention on Swiss (clothing) retailers. It explic-
itly targeted 15 firms, chosen after conducting a study on the Swiss clothing 
sector. Swiss firms reacted quicker than the French ones: Except for two of 
them who kept ignoring claims, most already had codes of conducts (eight 
targeted companies reported this fact) or quickly adopted them (five targeted 
companies), and put forward their “social commitment” when responding to 
consumer letters (Mach, 2001, pp. 14-15). The actions and instruments 
referred to in these statements, such as a green clothing line or the support of 
development projects, were not directly related to the campaign claims. They 
took up only partial aspects thereof. In its regularly updated company evalu-
ations, the campaign criticized them as not going far enough and encouraged 
consumers to react to these responses by writing letters or asking critical 
questions when shopping.
Three of the 15 initially targeted companies went further and approached 
campaign organizers to develop a joint pilot project of code monitoring: 
Migros (one of the two main Swiss retailers), Switcher (a specialized cloth-
ing store), and Veillon (a mail-order clothing store). This multi-stakeholder 
project took place between 2000 and 2002, and then continued with state 
funding under a new name and structure. During the pilot phase, a new orga-
nizational entity was created that conducted audits of factories and wrote 
(confidential) reports.
Switzerland: Phase 2—Diversity of Strategies
The pilot project led to conflicts within the campaign coalition. The two 
development aid organizations supported the compromises negotiated with 
the companies in the pilot project, while the campaigners from the advocacy 
group defended a more uncompromising stance. This situation led to a divi-
sion of labor between the organizations, two of them remaining in the multi-
stakeholder project and leaving the campaign coalition, and the third one 
continuing campaigning. After the split of the coalition, the campaign oper-
ated a tactical change. The new person in charge pursued a more consumerist 
strategy. In 2004, the campaign published a brochure in collaboration with a 
consumer association. In this brochure, retailers were now ranked according 
to their social record but, in contrast with the French case, some of them were 
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designated as having good practices. In addition, some ethical labels were put 
forward in recommendations. While this tactical change was linked to a 
change in personnel and organizational preferences—in an interview, the 
new person in charge expressed a preference for rankings rather than mobi-
lizing strategies—it also reflected the changing landscape with regard to the 
rise of a variety of initiatives on “ethical” clothes. On one hand, some firms 
had collaborated with the campaign, thus “deserving” a positive evaluation. 
But on the other hand, firms had also launched many ethical labels in the 
years preceding these evaluations. Already during the pilot project, Swiss 
clothing firms had started developing, sometimes together with NGOs, ethi-
cal labels, and product lines. Most importantly, the fair trade organization 
Max Havelaar, founded in Switzerland by the country’s main development 
agencies (among them the two development aid organizations involved in the 
CCC), started labeling fair trade cotton, and Helvetas, another development 
agency, promoted organic cotton, through a project financed jointly by the 
Swiss government, the NGO, and some clothing retailers (including Migros). 
Ethical labels were not necessarily initially designed by firms and NGOs as a 
strategic response to the campaign; they also responded to a consumer 
demand that was partly independent of this dynamic. But such labels were 
actively used by firms to publicly display their ethical commitments and 
became an essential part of the general campaign dynamic. The campaign 
itself acknowledged this circumstance when it started to specifically recom-
mend some labels in its rankings published from 2004 on.
After those ethical clothing lines, the second notable response by Swiss 
retailers in this sequence was their embracing of the European-wide monitor-
ing initiative Business Social Compliance Initiative (BSCI). Together with 
other European general retailers, Migros played a key role in the develop-
ment of this European social auditing initiative whose functioning is very 
similar to the French ICS. It was thus an alternative or, depending on one’s 
point of view, a competitor of the multi-stakeholder initiative (MSI) that had 
come out of the pilot project. For a certain time, Migros was part of both 
institutions, but it eventually quit its participation in the MSI. In 2005 already, 
six Swiss retailers targeted by the campaign were part of BSCI (2006), while 
the campaign-initiated monitoring project was left with but one member 
(Switcher) when Migros opted out of it.
Explaining Changing Outcomes Over Time
Across companies and over time, strategic responses were diverse, showing 
the variety of means companies have to react to rising demands and their 
active role in shaping the outcomes of interactions with movements. Looking 
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at the interaction phases reveals a general dynamic at play: From initial gains 
with at least some targeted companies acquiescing to demands, one passes to 
a situation where companies use other strategies that are less favorable to 
movement demands or even hostile toward them. There is a common “impact 
curb” that resembles an upside-down U with a flattening end, from early 
“successes”—strong in the Swiss case, less so in France—to their subsequent 
loss.
Table 1 resumes the responses by firms along the two phases. It distin-
guishes between high, medium, and low levels of compliance with social 
movement demands, and gives a rapid overlook on the strategic responses of 
firms and the legitimacy sources they build on, as well as the explanations 
offered throughout this analytical part. What explains early successes, why 
did firms withdraw from concessions, and how could firms “get away” with 
less legitimate responses?
The Circumstances Favoring Early Gains
By putting public pressure on companies through shaming and blaming, the 
campaigns created disruption costs and a legitimacy deficit for the targeted 
corporations that did not comply with the new norm of corporate responsibil-
ity advocated by the campaign. Not all companies reacted in the same way to 
this reputational threat. The description of the two phases has shown that 
most firms at first avoided claims and buffered them by denying their respon-
sibility. From avoidance, some of them went to compromise, adopting codes 
of conduct as a partial form of compliance. Some went further and accepted 
to participate in forms of collaboration. There were thus different degrees of 
willingness to comply with new norms, some firms being more inclined to 
submit to more constraining ways of reestablishing their legitimacy when 
faced with challenges. Firms’ cost structure and disposition to adopt corpo-
rate social responsibility provided them with different sets of incentives to 
comply with demands. Those with low incentives never complied and were 
avoiding or possibly compromising by adopting partial solutions. But for 
those with higher incentives, two specific factors made collaborations possi-
ble and also particularly attractive.
First, early outcomes were mostly favored by the newness of the demands 
and the ensuing lack of established routines to deal with them. As one Swiss 
corporate interviewee said, codes of conduct as an instrument in corporate 
social responsibility were completely new and unknown in this sector in 
Switzerland in the 1990s, and even more so forms of monitoring them. 
Managers in firms simply did not know how to tackle these issues. They were 
hit unprepared. In this situation, campaign makers became privileged 
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partners. In the words of a member of the Swiss campaign coalition involved 
in the pilot project: “At one moment, the corporations respond and say, ok, 
what do you propose? We are ready to make a code of conduct but we would 
like you to help us, we don’t really know what it is” (Interview with cam-
paign official, Lausanne, Switzerland, June 2007). Campaigners were thus 
approached as holders of a particular expertise that could help companies 
deal with this problem—a situation they had not necessarily anticipated. 
Early collaboration was possible in this particular conjuncture where demands 
were new and campaigners viewed as the most promising potential partners 
to deal with them. Campaign makers could provide firms with legitimacy and 
had an expert knowledge on the topic that other civil society actors lacked.
But the situation of newness of demand alone was not sufficient. The close 
analysis of the cases reveals that early collaboration between firms and cam-
paign makers also required either internal allies (Raeburn, 2004) or at least 
previous experiences of collaboration between campaign makers and firms. 
In Switzerland, a certain proximity between campaign makers and their cor-
porate targets already existed thanks to prior campaigns and experiences of 
collaboration. Examples include the Max Havelaar fair trade labels for food, 
which had been introduced several years before, or the first ever “social 
clause” that two of the organizations behind the Swiss CCC had helped estab-
lish together with Migros in the early 1980s. In France, such proximity did 
not exist. The CCC was the first time companies had been targeted directly 
by social movement actors, and there were thus no previous experiences to 
build on. Accounts by interviewees and other studies (Delalieu, 2008) sug-
gest that the collaboration with Auchan was closely tied to a person from the 
firm’s board. The coordinator of the campaign recalls it:
They (Auchan’s managers) asked themselves, who are these people, are they 
going to burn our shops or are they open for dialogue . . . Their communication 
director at this time was a former member of cabinet from a socialist minister 
of industry, and he had personal views that were close to us. He had a position 
of director and had access to the managing board and a certain influence. 
(Interview with campaign official, Paris, France, April, 2008)
Proximity between the campaign and its targets thus had to be built in France 
(“Who are these people, are they going to burn our shops or are they open for 
dialogue?”), and an internal ally (Raeburn, 2004) played a crucial role in the 
collaboration between Auchan and the French campaign. Carrefour, which 
also responded to the movement demands, pursued another strategy and 
sought out a different source of legitimacy by collaborating with a competing 
social movement organization. This counterexample thus illustrates the 
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important role internal allies played in bridging between campaign makers 
and their targets. It suggests that newness alone is not sufficient; it also 
requires social ties, proximity, and the ensuing mutual trust for collaborations 
to take place.
Push and Pull Factors for Withdrawal
In both the Swiss and the French case, negative socialization played a role in 
firms’ withdrawal from concessions. An interviewee from one of the Swiss 
companies participating in the pilot project pointed at the difficulties experi-
enced due to the slow processes. Interviews with campaign makers in France 
and Delalieu’s (2008) study highlight that disagreements within the cam-
paign coalition between unions and NGOs made collaboration tedious. 
Making matters worse, the French campaign also lost its internal ally, who 
left Auchan and was replaced by a person who did not have strong ties to the 
campaign makers. Finally, increasing polarization between campaign makers 
and firms in France undermined the trust that had started to build up in the 
previous interaction phase. The tactical innovation of the rankings played an 
important role in this escalation. The rankings had the opposite effect of what 
the campaigners had hoped for. Instead of pitting the different firms against 
one another and thus pushing firms to compete on these ethical issues, as the 
campaign makers had in mind, the companies’ reaction was to reinforce inter-
firm cooperation within the ICS. Targeted retailers perceived the campaign’s 
tactic as aggressive “blackmailing” by “self-proclaimed censors who erect 
themselves as the Temple’s guard,” according to a blog post by the director of 
Leclerc, one big French retailer that joined the ICS (quoted in Barraud de 
Lagerie, 2010, pp. 254-255). Increasingly, firms perceived campaigners more 
as their radical opponents than potential partners.
In sum, there were push factors in both cases explaining firms’ withdrawal 
from concessions. But these were not the only ones at work. At the same 
time, firms had been working on alternative, business-driven solutions of 
code monitoring building on other legitimacy sources, and the development 
of these alternatives facilitated withdrawal and acted as a pull factor. It was 
when movements lost their initial quasi-monopoly on conveying legitimacy 
that the dynamic reversed.
Companies in both countries turned to inter-firm cooperation to create 
business-driven monitoring initiatives, which excluded civil society partici-
pation, in particular collaboration with campaign makers. In Switzerland, 
this approach took place through the development of a monitoring initiative 
carried out by European retailers, of which Migros was a driving force. 
Soon, many Swiss companies joined the BSCI, and Migros, which had been 
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part of both the multi-stakeholder monitoring scheme and the BSCI, would 
eventually quit the former and thus end its strategy of compliance. Something 
similar happened in France with the ICS. Instead of collaborating with the 
campaign coalition, the French retailers ended up cooperating with each 
other in a business-driven monitoring initiative. The FCD, in developing a 
common response to the campaign by all big retailers, connected the differ-
ent retailers with one another on this particular issue, and more and more 
companies joined the ICS over time.
Inter-firm cooperation conveys more legitimacy than solutions at the firm 
level and can thus to some extent make up for the lack of social movement 
participation. By pooling their resources and cooperating with each other, 
firms could show that as an industry, they took the problem seriously and were 
willing to cooperate to find common solutions. In addition, such arrangements 
made sure that all (or at least many) competing companies adopt the same 
counterstrategy, thus providing certainty and avoiding competition within the 
industry. When developing a monitoring scheme driven by firms themselves, 
firms took up some of the campaign demands such as adopting codes of con-
ducts and independently controlling them. However, they also left out core 
demands, such as participation of third parties from civil society. Instead, 
firms managed the issue of labor standards through means that were entirely 
under their control. Business-driven initiatives were thus less encompassing 
than the multi-stakeholder monitoring schemes advocated by campaigners; 
they lacked mainly the input legitimacy of inclusiveness through civil society 
participation (Mena & Palazzo, 2012).
Because of their lack of input legitimacy, these business-driven initiatives 
remained contested; on their own, their legitimacy was threatened as long as 
campaigns kept attacking them. Firms used other compensating strategies to 
make up for this legitimacy deficit. Their concrete outlook depended on 
national contextual factors and on the interaction dynamics of the campaigns. 
The comparison points at two different pathways of this process. In both 
national cases, firms combined the strategy of inter-firm cooperation with 
another, context-dependent compensating strategy to compensate for legiti-
macy losses: in France, defying campaign makers by publicly attacking them, 
and in Switzerland, market-based counterstrategies.
France: Compensating Legitimacy Through Fighting Back
In the French case, firms engaged in public actions of defiance to undermine 
the credibility of their opponents to assess the legitimacy of their initiative. 
With increasing polarization between the campaigners and retailers, collabo-
ration became impossible. But legitimacy was still a preoccupation for the 
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firms, as their initiative was viewed very critically not only by campaigners 
who denounced it vociferously and called it a form of “window-dressing,” 
but also by the French press, which expressed doubts. To counter these cri-
tiques and defend its monitoring program, the FCD published an open letter 
in which it presented its monitoring initiative as a serious and efficient effort 
to deal with the issue of labor rights in production plants. The same letter also 
attempted to disqualify the methods and positions of the campaign coalition. 
It stated, in particular, that while the FCD had “largely included” the cam-
paign coalition in the ICS, the campaign had not held up the same transpar-
ency standards when establishing the ranking. On the issue of the respect of 
labor standards, the letter stated, “It is easy to give lessons but more difficult 
to work on the field to make things progress.” It further stated the FCD’s 
values, notably its will not to handle ethics as a subject of competition 
between corporations. Implicitly, it thus accused the campaign coalition of 
pushing corporations to compete on the issue of their ethical records (which 
was indeed the goal of the coalition). The corporations, according to the way 
the FCD framed it, were actually more ethical because they refused such a 
“marketing approach” and preferred making joint efforts. The general argu-
ment was thus that the French campaign wanted to use ethics as a marketing 
tool, whereas the retailers that were part of the ICS treated the issue dis-
creetly, through serious auditing and slow improvement.
Through this letter and other actions such as strategically scheduled press 
conferences and the refusal to respond to the questionnaires by the campaign 
makers, the firms thus counterattacked the campaign. The goal here is not to 
assess who is right or wrong in this contentious exchange but to show how 
the strategy of the retailers built on different sources of legitimacy and thus 
attempted to compensate for the fact that the monitoring initiative did not 
include participation of social movement actors. On one hand, the retailers 
stressed their own expertise and the program’s efficiency and discreet prog-
ress on the issue of labor rights, thus highlighting aspects of (output) legiti-
macy where they could compete with a multi-stakeholder program (Quack, 
2010). On the other hand, by questioning the campaign makers’ strategy and 
criticizing their position as both judge and jury, the retailers attempted to 
challenge the legitimacy of their opponents. Legitimation politics here means 
framing contests with the goal of questioning one’s opponent’s standing and 
legitimacy. Attacking the campaign makers’ competence, methods, and moti-
vations was a way of dismissing demands for multi-stakeholder solutions. If 
the campaign makers used questionable methods and were not competent in 
their domain, why should they participate in the monitoring of labor stan-
dards? Companies thus used the weapons that campaigners usually use, 
namely, publicly naming and shaming their opponents.
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Switzerland: Compensating Legitimacy Through Market-Based 
Strategies
In Switzerland, market-based strategies compensated for the legitimacy 
deficit of the business-driven monitoring initiative (BSCI). BSCI was per-
ceived as lacking in legitimacy, not only by campaign makers but also by 
companies. The case of Migros can illustrate this perception. According to 
a participant in the pilot project, Migros hoped to associate a civil society 
organization, if possible the CCC and its monitoring project, to the BSCI: 
“They hoped that another organization from the outside gives the BSCI an 
independent label. Their problem was always that they lacked legitimacy, 
because it is a business-driven initiative. What they were looking for was 
legitimacy” (Interview with official of pilot project, Bern, Switzerland, 
June 2007). But eventually, the company decided to quit the pilot project 
although no civil society organization was associated to BSCI. Ethical 
product labels helped firms compensate for this legitimacy deficit. Ethical 
labels often originated in collaboration with competing movement actors 
that were not part of the campaign, such as Max Havelaar for fair trade cot-
ton or Helvetas for organic one; the activity of these competing movement 
actors thus created opportunities for firms to develop new strategic 
responses (Balsiger, 2015b). The attractiveness of ethical labels for compa-
nies was increased by the success of previous labels such as fair trade or 
organic food, which had shown that there was indeed a market for ethical 
products (contrary to France at that time, where retailers had not yet 
embraced ethical consumption). Developing ethical labels by collaborating 
with movement organizations allowed firms to sidestep campaign demands. 
Ethical labels took up certain movement demands—and could even go 
beyond them, as in the case of fair trade rather than “just” minimal social 
standards—but did so only for a few products. Labels constituted ways for 
companies to display their ethical commitment without explicitly respond-
ing to more encompassing demands. The competing movement actors who 
were at the origin of such labels could thus offer legitimacy at a lower cost, 
allowing firms to divert attention from contested practices to their “good 
deeds.” This strategy was complementary to the progressive embracement 
of the business-driven BSCI, which lacked social movement endorsement; 
the corporate response thus rested on two pillars or sources of legitimacy: 
BSCI and ethical labels, with the latter being able to partly compensate for 
the legitimacy deficit of the former. Rather than criticizing this develop-
ment, the campaign’s tactical reorientation toward a consumerist repertoire 
explicitly recommending specific labels actually contributed to further 
validate this approach.
21
In sum, the comparative analysis shows that legitimacy-compensating 
strategies varied across countries and depended on the context and the inter-
action dynamics of the campaigns. In both cases, firms cooperated with each 
other to develop business-driven monitoring initiatives, and in both cases, 
they compensated the legitimacy deficit of these initiatives by building on 
alternative sources of legitimacy. In Switzerland, those were provided by 
competing movement actors, which developed ethical product labels that 
companies used. The potential of “ethical markets” had previously been 
demonstrated by the success of organic and fair trade food products. Ethical 
clothing lines could thus not only compensate legitimacy, but they could 
even be good for business by catering to the growing demand for “ethical” 
products. In France, the potential of this market had not yet been established, 
and the rise of ethical product lines and labels only took place at a later 
stage. Retailers relied on a different compensating strategy to make up for 
the legitimacy deficit of their monitoring initiative. On one hand, they 
stressed the initiative’s output legitimacy and the retailers’ competence in 
this domain. And on the other hand, they chose to fight back against cam-
paign makers. They publicly counterattacked their opponents and thus 
attempted to delegitimize them.
Conclusion
The anti-sweatshop campaigns in Switzerland and France targeted clothing 
retailers demanding that they adopt codes of conduct and have them moni-
tored independently. The study uses a theoretical framework that views 
movements and their targets as interacting in arenas of contention, with both 
sets of actors seeking to shape outcomes in their favor over time. Through 
their contentious tactics, movement actors seek to challenge firms’ legiti-
macy and thus to push them to respond to new claims. In turn, firms develop 
strategies that enable them to regain legitimacy in view of ongoing chal-
lenges by movement actors. Examined chronologically, the analysis reveals 
the phenomenon of initial outcomes that comply with movement demands, 
which are then lost over time. Although initial gains were more limited in 
France, there is a similar impact curb in both cases, where early gains cannot 
be maintained as new actors rise and the institutional environment gets 
reorganized.
This outcome dynamic confirms findings of other studies on social move-
ments facing as yet unprepared opponents (Jasper & Poulsen, 1993). In such 
situations, social movement actors have a strategic advantage because of the 
newness of the demands, which makes them the go-to partner for companies 
willing to (at least partially) comply with the new demands. The study offers 
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evidence for this dynamic for the novel context of movements facing corpo-
rate targets. However, it also shows that by far not all companies respond 
with compliance in this first stage. Some seek alternative legitimacy sources 
from the beginning, while others do not react at all. Newness, in other words, 
is not a sufficient cause for early successes. Internal allies and/or proximity 
with campaigns are needed, too.
Beyond this confirmation and extension of previous findings to new con-
texts, the study also suggests an explanation of the mechanisms that can 
account for the loss of initial gains in this particular context. It shows that 
firms could counter movement demands and get away without fully comply-
ing and collaborating with campaign makers by using strategies combining 
different sources of legitimacy. In both cases, firms cooperated with each 
other and developed a business-driven monitoring initiative. These initia-
tives, however, lack the inclusiveness that characterize the multi-institutional 
monitoring schemes favored by campaign makers, and were therefore highly 
criticized by the anti-sweatshop campaigns. While many studies have pointed 
at this legitimacy deficit (Fransen, 2012a, 2012b; Mena & Palazzo, 2012), 
this study reveals how firms attempt to overcome it when facing continuing 
social movement pressure. Corporations combined their reliance on business-
driven monitoring through compensating strategies to make up for the legiti-
macy deficit. Compensation was not strictly limited to the input/output 
legitimacies of particular monitoring initiatives (Mena & Palazzo, 2012), but 
included a much wider range of strategies. In France, it meant engaging in 
frame contests and attempting to delegitimize their opponent. In Switzerland, 
it took place through ethical labels, a market-based strategy that partly took 
up movement demands and built on collaborations with competing social 
movement actors. Through such context-dependent compensation strategies, 
firms thus managed to keep the upper hand and to get away with less 
encompassing solutions while maintaining their legitimacy.
Through this comparative case study, the article thus contributes to the 
study of interactions between social movements and corporations. Studies 
so far have not paid sufficient attention to the range of strategies firms use to 
fight back when they are targeted by social movement campaigns. More 
specifically, this study highlights the role different sources of legitimacy 
play in corporate counterstrategies and shows how firms combine legiti-
macy-seeking strategies in context-dependent ways. Overall, the analysis 
points at the capacity of firms to actively fight back against their challengers 
and shape movement outcomes over time.
This pattern of outcome dynamics as well as the mechanisms of legitimacy 
compensation and the legitimacy-seeking strategies are likely to be found in 
other comparable cases where social movements oppose corporations, too. 
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But four important scope conditions limit the generalizability of the findings 
of this comparative study and suggest tracks for future research. First, there 
are situations where such outcome dynamics are less likely and early gains can 
be maintained over time. What is distinct with the campaigns studied here 
compared with similar ones is that the initial outcomes failed to get locked into 
stable institutional arrangements perceived as legitimate by major firms and 
social movement organizations. The lack of such stable institutions made it 
very easy for firms to backtrack from initial commitments. In the context of 
movements targeting firms and seeking forms of “private regulation,” creating 
stable institutions constitutes a particularly difficult challenge, but this diffi-
culty does not mean that it cannot succeed. If it succeeds, withdrawal from 
initial concessions is much more difficult.
Second, not in all cases will one observe the same outcome dynamics of 
early gains. In many cases, firms can simply ignore movement demands and 
do not need to engage in legitimacy struggles. The distinct characteristics of 
the campaigns in this study were (a) their relative strength compared with 
many other anti-corporate campaigns and (b) the international context, with 
similar campaigns going on in other European countries and in North 
America, meaning that the issue was very present and firms forced to do 
something about it. When campaigns are weaker, firms often do not need to 
respond at all. Furthermore, it is also likely that more recent movements face 
a different context, as firms facing new demands can now also build on the 
experiences and strategic repertoires developed by clothing retailers, who 
were among the first ones to be confronted with widespread contention from 
social movement campaigns. Future studies should analyze whether and how 
companies from an industry challenged by social movement campaigns learn 
from the previous experiences by companies pertaining to a different indus-
try. Third, the continuing pressure from campaign makers throughout the sec-
ond sequence of the interactions is a crucial scope condition, too. In the 
absence of such ongoing pressure, legitimacy ceases to be such a crucial 
issue, and firms may not need to worry about compensating legitimacy at all. 
Finally, this study is limited to a comparison of outcome dynamics in two 
countries. The comparative approach can show the context-dependent char-
acter of legitimacy compensation, but additional cases would be needed to 
see whether similar dynamics and mechanisms of campaign outcomes can be 
found in other contexts and what other legitimacy-compensating strategies 
companies use.
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Notes
1. The terms success and successful refer to the point of view of the social move-
ment organizations. They mean “outcomes that meet the demands of the move-
ment.” Scholars of social movement outcomes generally prefer avoiding the
terms of success/failure, primarily because social movement success is not only
measured by its capacity to achieve its immediate goals, but can mean a broad
range of things that are beyond this, such as the capacity to mobilize a lot of peo-
ple (Giugni, 2004, 2008). However, because this article focuses on the outcomes
directly related to movement demands, speaking in terms of success makes
sense and also allows to point at the outcome dynamic observed in these cases,
where early successes (from the movement’s point of view) were lost over time.
Outcomes are thus open ended. Of course, from the point of view of companies,
the picture is quite different: They were successful in implementing responses
that were more adapted from their point of view.
2. Rather than archives in the established sense, these were the (unsorted) internal
campaign documents (memos, letters, projects, notes, etc.) that were located at
the campaign headquarters. The author was given access to all these documents.
3. Importantly, the analysis performed here concentrates on the interactions between
the campaign and its immediate targets, clothing retailers. Of course, other play-
ers also intervened in this process, and while they did not constitute the focus of
my fieldwork, data were gathered on the actions of many of them, too. While
states were relatively absent as both objects of claims or claimants, other impor-
tant players include competing social movement organizations, the international
secretariat of the campaigns, and workers in clothing factories. Competing social
movement organizations, in particular, played an important role as alternative
sources of legitimacy. As for the European-wide coordination, it was largely
responsible for the common claims of the different campaigns, but national coali-
tions had great autonomy in choosing targets and action forms. Shop-floor work-
ers, finally, are largely absent in this analysis for two reasons. First, the project did
not study the question of outcomes for workers—this would have been a different
research question requiring another research design and data gathering process.
Second, their role for the concrete outlook of campaign interactions in different
states was reflected in campaign makers’ actions but is not directly addressed
here. Feedback from unions and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in pro-
duction countries informed the campaign’s claims and some of its stances, such as
its vociferous critique of social auditing (see, for example, the report Looking for
a Quick Fix, CCC, 2005). Movement actors also had large networks with many
organizations from production countries. They integrated their voices, which
played a role in their assessment of different options such as the relative merit of
boycotts or the important role of unions in factory monitoring.
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4. Generally speaking, however, the few systematic studies of private regulation
in the textile industry are quite skeptical regarding the overall effectiveness of
auditing in improving working conditions (see in particular Locke, 2013).
5. Two points of limitation of this presentation are important to note beforehand.
First, to enable a comparison with the Swiss case and to reduce complexity, the
interactions identified focus on the main conflict the campaign prompted. Actually,
the French campaign opened up a “second front” at around half time, switching
arenas toward the political realm. Political office holders and municipalities were
targeted in their function of collective consumers of clothes (such as police uni-
forms for example). However, this change of arena did not lead to an abandonment
of the initial targets, and the study therefore leaves this strand of the campaign
aside. Similarly, the campaigns also conducted more short-term actions, so-called
urgent appeals, targeting corporations on very specific issues such as labor con-
flicts or production in Burma. These cases are not discussed here.
6. See the “experience report” campaign makers wrote that was published on a data-
base for actors of international solidarity: http://www.educasol.org/bdd/experience/
format_long.php?ret=index.php&;fiche=54 (accessed October 22, 2015).
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